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Abstract. The rogue DHCP is unauthorized server that releases the incorrect IP 
address to users and sniffs the traffic illegally. The contribution specially provides 
privacy to users and enhances the security aspects of mobile supported collaborative 
framework (MSCF) explained in [24].The paper introduces multi-frame signature-
cum anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (MSAIDS) supported with novel 
algorithms and inclusion of new rules in existing IDS. The major target of 
contribution is to detect the malicious attacks and blocks the illegal activities of rogue 
DHCP server. This innovative security mechanism reinforces the confidence of users, 
protects network from illicit intervention and restore the privacy of users. Finally, the 
paper validates the idea through simulation and compares the findings with known 
existing techniques. 
Keywords: DHCP server, rogue DHCP server, signature-cum anomaly based Intrusion 
detection, sniffer, Mobile collaborative learning. 
1. Introduction 
 The rapid advancement in network technologies has augmented the use of mobile 
devices in open, large scale and heterogeneous environments. The mobile devices 
create the base for users to exchange information anytime and anywhere in the world. 
The exploitation of mobile devices has not only underpinned communication but also 
provided many chances for malicious attackers to break the privacy of users. The 
mobile users are extremely reliant on DHCP server for obtaining IP address because 
DHCP server offers highly structured service to mobile devices. 
 From other side, unauthorized DHCP server (rogue DHCP) produces the problems 
for users and cracks the security. It invites intruders and attackers to redirect traffic of 
any device that uses the DHCP. Intruder modifies the original contents of 
communication. The malware and Trojans horse install rogue DHCP server 
automatically on network and affect the legitimate servers .If rogue DHCP server 
assigns an incorrect IP address faster than original DHCP server, it causes potentially 
black hole for users. To control the malicious attacks and avoiding the network 
blockage, the network administrators put their efforts to guarantee the components of 
server, using various tools. The graphical user interface (GUI) tool is used to prevent 
the attack of rogue detection [5]. Idea of using multilayer switches may be configured 
to control the attacks of rogue DHCP server but it is little bit complex and not 
efficient to detect rogue DHCP server.  
The DHCP spoofing is another solution for detecting rogue DHCP server. However, if 
single segment is spoofed that can damage the whole network. Spoofing method takes 
long time till intruder has enough time to capture the traffic and assign wrong IP 
address [8]. Time-tested, DHCP Find Roadkil.net’s, DHCP Sentry, Dhcploc.exe and 
DHCP-probe provide the solution to detect and defend rogue DHCP server malware 
[6]. All of these tools cannot detect the new malicious attacks [2].  
Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) is another technique to support the 
mobile agents. This technique helps the system to sense the intrusion from incoming 
and outgoing traffics to detect known attacks [1]. Ant colony optimization (ACO) 
based distributed intrusion detection system is introduced to detect intrusions in the 
distributed environments. It detects the visible activities of attackers and identifies the 
attack of false alarm rate but it does not detect DOS attacks [3]. Anomaly based 
intrusion detection are introduced to detect those attacks for which no signatures exist 
[4], [6], [10]. This paper introduces the multi-frame signature-cum anomaly based 
intrusion detection system supported with novel algorithms, inclusion of new rules in 
existing IDS to detect malicious attacks and increase the privacy and confidentiality 
of users. The reminder of paper is organized as follows: The section 2 describes 
related work and background study. Possible attacks of rogue DHCP server are 
explained in Section 3. The proposed solutions including functional components are 
given in section 4. Simulation setup is explained in section 5. The analysis of result 
and discussion are given in section 6. Finally conclusion of the paper is given in 
section 7. 
2. Related Work and Background Study 
 The modern technologies and its deployment in computer and mobile devices have 
not only created new opportunities for better services but from other perspective, 
privacy of the users is highly questionable. The network-intruder and virus contagion 
extremely affect the computer systems and its counterparts. They also alter the top 
confidential data. Handling these issues and restoring the security of systems, IDS are 
introduced to control malicious attackers.IDS are erroneous and not providing the 
persistent solution in its current shape. The first contribution in the field of intrusion 
detection was deliberated by J.P Anderson in [7].The author introduced notion about 
the security of computer systems and related threats. Initially, three attacks were 
discovered that are misfeasors, external penetrations and internal penetrations. 
The classification of typical IDS is discussed in [17]. The focus of the contribution is 
about reviewing the agent-based IDS for mobile devices. They have stated problems 
and strength of each category of classification and suggested the methods to improve 
the performance of mobile agent for IDS design.  
Four types of attacks are discussed in [21] for security of network. They have also 
simulated the behavior of these attacks by using simulation of ns2. A multi-ant 
colonies technique is proposed in [22] for clustering the data. It involves independent, 
parallel ant colonies and a queen ant agent. Authors state that each process for ant 
colony takes dissimilar forms of ants at moving speed. They have generated various 
clustering results by using ant-based clustering algorithm. The findings show that 
outlier’s lowest strategy for choosing the recent data set has the better performance. 
The contribution covers the clustering-based approach.  
The work done in [18] is about the framework of distributed Intrusion Detection 
System that supports mobile agents. The focus of work is to sense both outside and 
inside network division. The mobile-agents control remote sniffer, data and known 
attacks. The paper has introduced data mining method for detection and data analysis. 
Dynamic Multi-Layer Signature based (DMSIDS) is proposed in [2]. It detects 
looming threats by using mobile agents. Authors have introduced small and well-
organized multiple databases. The small signature-based databases are also updated at 
the same time regularly. 
In addition, all of the proposed techniques cover general idea of network 
detection but proposed MSAIDS technique handles the irreplaceable issues of DHCP 
rogue server. The contribution also prevents almost all types of DOS attacks. The 
major contribution of work is to validate technique by employing innovative 
algorithms and inclusion of new rules in existing tradition. It also helps the legitimate 
users to start secure and reliable communication frequently over MCL [23]. One of 
the most promising aspects of this research is uniqueness because there is no single 
contribution is available in survey about the DHCP rogue and its severe targeted 
attacks.  
3. Possible Attacks of Rogue DHCP Server 
The introduction of distributed system has highly affected the security [11]. There are 
several forms of vulnerabilities and vigorous threats to expose the security of systems. 
To take important security measures and enhancing the secure needs for 
organizations, several mechanisms are implemented but those mechanisms also invite 
attackers to play with privacy and confidentiality of users. One of the major threats 
for privacy of data is intervention of rogue DHCP server. The first sign of problem 
associated with rogue DHCP server is discontinuation of network service. The static 
and portable devices start experiencing due to network issues. The issues are started 
by assigning the wrong IP address to requested users to initiate the session.  
The malicious attackers take the advantages of rogue DHCP server and sniff the 
traffic sent by legitimate users. Rogue DHCP server spreads wrong network 
parameters that create the bridge for intruders to expose the privacy. Trojans like 
DNS-changing installs the rogue DHCP server and pollutes network. Rogue DHCP 
server creates several problems to expose the privacy of legitimate users. We highlight 
two major types of security attacks to be created by rogue DHCP server. 
3.1. Sniffing the Network Traffic 
It is brutal irony in information security that the features which are used to protect 
static and portable devices to function in efficient and smooth manner; and from other 
side, same features maximize the chances for intruders to compromise and exploit the 
same tools and networks. Hence packet sniffing is used to monitor network traffic to 
prevent the network from bottleneck and make an efficient data transmission. 
Intruders use same resources for collecting information for illegal use. Rogue DHCP 
server helps malicious intruders to expose privacy of users. When networks are victim 
of rogue DHCP server that provides very important information related to IP address, 
domain name system and default gateway to intruders. 
 All of this information helps intruders to sniff traffic of legitimate users. Rogue 
DHCP server is introduced on secure environment to collect confidential information 
and sniffs the traffic and wreaks the privacy of users shown in figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Sniffing the traffic and masquerading attack 
 
Rogue DHCP server also facilitates for intruders to capture the MAC address of 
legitimate users. It causes sniffing the traffic through switch. In this case, intruder 
spoofs IP addresses of both sender and receiver and plays the man-of-middle to sniff 
traffic and extract important contents of communication. It causes the great attack on 
privacy of users.  
3.2. Denial of Service Attack (DOS) 
Intruder gets support through rogue DHCP server also uses DOS attacks after sniffing 
confidential contents of traffic. Due to DOS attack, the access of important services 
for legitimate users is blocked. Intruder often crashes routers, host, servers and other 
computer entity by sending overwhelming amount of traffic on the network. Rogue 
DHCP server creates friendly environment for intruder to launch DOS attacks because 
intruder needs small effort for this kind of attack and it is also difficult to detect and 
attack back to intruder [12]. In addition, it is also easy to create floods on internet 
because it is comprised of limited resources including processing power, bandwidth 
and storage capabilities. Rogue DHCP makes flooding attack at domain name system 
(DNS) because target of intruder is to prevent the legitimate users [12] & [16].  
These attacks on DNS have obtained varying success while disturbing resolution of 
names related to targeted zone. Rogue DHCP server takes advantages of inevitable 
human errors during installation, configuration and developing software. It creates 
several types of DOS attack documented in literature [20].  Intruder with support of 
Rogue DHCP server makes three types of attacks: fragile (smurf), SYN Flood and 
DNS DOS attacks shown in figure 2. These attacks are vulnerable and dangerous for 
security point of view. 
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4. Proposed Solution (Multi-frame Signature-cum-anomaly 
based Intrusion detection system) 
Networks are being converged rapidly and thousands of heterogeneous devices 
are connected. The devices integrated in large networks, communicate through 
several types of protocols and technologies. This large scale heterogeneous 
environment invites the intruders to expose security of users. Hence, IDS are 
introduced to recognize the patterns of attacks, if they are not fixed strategically, 
many intruders cross IDS by traversing alternate route in network.  
Many signature-based IDS are available to detect attacks but some of new attacks 
cannot be identified and controlled. Anomaly-based IDS is another option but it 
only detects limited new attacks. The multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based 
intrusion detection system (MSAIDS) supported with algorithms is proposed to 
resolve issue of DHCP rogue. The proposed framework consists of detecting 
server that controls IDS and its related three units: (i) DHCP verifier unit (ii) 
signature database (iii) anomaly database.  
During each detection process, intrusion detection starts matching from DHCP 
verifier, if any malicious activity is detected that stops process otherwise checks 
with two units until finds either malicious activity or not. Figure 3 shows 
MSAIDS. 
INTRUSION DETECTION SERVER
DHCP VERIFIER
ANOMALY BASED
SIGNATURE BASED
DHCP SERVER
ROGUE DHCP SERVER
DETECTING SERVER
ROUTER
SENDER
INTRUDER
RECEIVER
REAL TIME COMMUNICATION
 SERVER
INTERNET
UN
SU
CC
ES
SF
UL
 
Figure 3. Multi-frame signature-cum-anomaly based IDS 
The detecting server (DS) is responsible to check inbound and outbound traffic for 
issuance of IP address. The DS gets IP request (inbound traffic) from routers and 
forwards to DHCP server after satisfactory checkup. When any IP address is released 
for requested node then applies DHCP detecting algorithm for validation of DHCP 
server and detecting types of attack shown in algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 1: Verify DHCP server and detecting the attack 
1. Input: MF =(FD, FS,FA & I) 
2. Output : For every strategy I € FA, I € FS, D € FD) 
3. D = Each valid DHCP Server 
4. IP= Internet protocol address 
5. N= Number of mobile devices 
6. FD= Frame DHCP server 
7.  If D € FD 
8. IP→ N 
9. endif 
10. S= Number of available signatures in signature based Intrusion detection 
system (SIDS) 
11. FS= Frame of signatures 
12. FS ⊆ SIDS 
13. I= Number & Types of attacks 
14.  For ( I=S;  I ≤ FS; I++) 
15. If   I  ⊆ FS 
16. SIDS attack alert 
17. endif 
18. endfor 
19. A= Number of signatures available in Anomaly based Intrusion detection 
system AIDS 
20. FA= Frame of AIDS 
21. FA ⊆ AIDS 
22. For  ( I =A; I ≤ FA ;  I ++) 
23.  If  I  ⊆ FA 
24. AIDS raises alert 
25. If ( I ∉ FS & I ∉ FA) 
26.  No alert ( No attack) 
27. endif 
28. endif 
29. endfor 
 
4.1. Monitoring Process of Detecting Server ( DS) 
The following rules collectively function to determine the anomalies. 
i. Pre-selected rules: They help to detect those patterns, which are already 
stored in DS that apply to identify the inbound traffic.  
ii. Post-selected rules:  They refer to those patterns which are stored for 
detection of legitimate DHCP server that help to identify outbound traffic. 
iii. Parameterized rules: They refer to many ingredients that help to set 
selected rules with unique value presented in the following: 
a. Validity ingredient: It helps to detect attack if intruder modifies the contents 
of message. 
b. Time interval ingredient: It helps to detect two types of attacks which are 
exhaustion attack and negligence attack. In exhaustion attack, the intruder 
increases message-sending rate. In negligence attack, intruder does not send 
the message. In addition, time interval for two consecutive messages is 
increased or decreased than allowed amount of time that gives sign of attack. 
c. Flooding ingredient:  It helps to identify attack on basis of noise and 
disturbance to be created in communication channel.  
d. Retransmission ingredient: It helps to determine attack, if retransmission 
does not occur before specified timeout period. 
e. High transmission radio range ingredients: It helps to determine SYN 
flood and wormhole attack, when intruder uses powerful radio sending 
message to further located node. 
f. Pattern replication ingredient: It helps to detect attack when same patterns 
are repeated several time, it blocks the DOS attacks.  
All of these ingredients collectively help to DS for detecting the attacks and figure 4 
shows the process how to determine valid IP address and attack. 
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Figure 4. Detecting attack and issuance of safe IP 
 DS also controls the multi frame that comprises of central IDS and integrated 
with three layers that control the misuse detection. 
4.2. Central IDS  
The aim of central IDS is to control and store messages received from DS. It works as 
middleware for DS and other layers to send the verification request and receive alerts. 
The main function of central IDS is to update and manage the policy according to 
nature of attacks. If it needs any change in attack-detection that is employed on all the 
layers. The central IDS implements updated policy is shown in figure no 5. 
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Figure 5. Policy of Central IDS for network 
4.3. DHCP Verifier 
DHCP verifier is top layer that distinguishes between rogue DHCP and original 
DHCP server. The signatures of original DHCP servers are stored at the DHCP 
verifier. It checks validity of DHCP server that issues IP address for client. On basis 
of stored signatures, DHCP server is identified whether it is rogue or original DHCP 
server. Top layer produces unique sign of alert for both DHCP rogue and original 
DHCP. Top layer receives parameters for verification from central IDS. DHCP 
verifier running on top layer is also responsible to return alert to central IDS. 
4.4. Signature Based Detection Layer 
Signature-based detection is middle layer that detects known threats. It compares 
signatures with observed events to determine possible attacks. Some known attacks 
are identified on basis of implemented security policy. For example, if telnet tries to 
use “root’ username that is violating security policy of organization that is considered 
known attack. If operating system has 645 status code values that is sign of host’s 
disabled auditing and refers as attack. If attachment is with file name “freepics.exe” 
that is alert of malware. Middle layer is effective for detection of known threats and 
using well-defined signature patterns of attack. The stored patterns are encoded in 
advance to match with network traffics to detect attack. This layer compares log entry 
with list of signatures by deploying string comparison operation. If signature based 
layer does not detect attack, anomaly based detection layer starts to process. 
4.5. Anomaly Based Detection Layer 
Lower layer is anomaly based detection that identifies unknown and DOS attacks. It 
works on pick-detect method. This method monitors inbound and outbound traffic 
Packets are evaluated, adaptive thresholds and mean values are set. It calculates the 
metrics and compares with thresholds [19]. On basis of comparisons, it detects 
various types of anomalies including false positive, false negative, true positive and 
true negative. If pick-detect methods determines true positive and false negative then 
it sends alert to Central IDS. The process of detecting anomalies is given in algorithm 
2. 
Algorithm 2: Detecting the types of alerts with AIDS 
1. FA= Frame of Anomalies 
2. FA ⊆ AIDS 
3. Si =  False Negative 
4. Sj= True negative 
5. Sk=  True positive 
6. Sk=  False positive 
7.  0 =  don’t match  & 1=  match 
m 
8. Sijkl = 1/d  ∑    Sijkl 
                  m=1 
9. Sij = { 0,  if  i & j 
10. No false negative & true positive  
11. Sij = { 1,  if  i & j 
12. false negative & true positive  
13. Alert of attack 
14. Skl = { 0,  if  k & l [ do not match] & 1, if  k &  l [match] 
15. Alert of true negative & false positive 
16. No sign of attack 
17. endif 
18. endif 
19. endif 
20. endif 
In addition to determine and calculate value of true positive and false negative; we 
apply algorithm 3 that helps to find attack and non-attack situation for TN and FN. 
Algorithm 3: Determine the sign of attack or non-sign of attack 
I. We select random odd prime number for TN and any even number for FN. 
2. The value of FN must not be exceeded than TN. 
3. Therefore, FN > 1 & FN< TN 
4. Here, FN= {2, 4, 6, 8…} & TN= {3, 5, 7, 11, 13…} 
5. Here sign of attack = ST, d = not exposed & b = exposed. 
6. b and d has constant value 1. 
7. Thus, ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b) 
8. If value of ST > 1, it means there is no sign of attack, if the value of ST < 1 that 
is sign of attack. 
   9. endif 
Assume FN = 2 & TN =3: BY applying the sign of attack formula: 
ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b): Substitute the values in given formula. 
ST = 3/ (3+ 1) / 2(2+1) 
ST = 9/8 
ST= 1.125 
ST > 1 
Here, ST > 1 means there is no sign of attack and we will be able to determine that 
is True negative (TN). 
5. Simulation Setup 
The previous sections have presented evidence of problems to be created by rogue 
DHCP server and including solutions to control problems. This section focuses on 
simulation setup and type of scenario. To validate the approach, the proposed solution 
has been implemented by using three methods: test bed simulation, discrete 
simulation in C++ and ns2 simulation.  
We discuss only test bed simulation in this paper that provides real time results in 
controlled and live user environments. This kind of simulation gives complete 
understanding about behavior of several types of attacks. All operations associated 
with MSAIDS approach and other three existing approaches: Dynamic Multi-Layer 
Signature based IDS (DMSIDS), Ant Colony Optimization based IDS (ACOIDS) & 
Signature based IDS provide the recital idea. The parameters of test bed simulation are 
only given in table 1. 
TABLE 1. Simulation parameters for test bed experiment. 
Name of parameters Specification 
MySQL database MySQL 5.5 
 
Type of IDS Rule based IDS 
 
GD Library gd 2.0.28 
 
Snort V-2 
 
Apache web server Apache http 2.0.64 Released 
 
PHP  PHP 5.3.8 (Server side language) 
ADODB Release 5.12 (abstraction library for PHP 
and Python) 
 
ACID  ACID PRO 7 
 
Stick Stick beats detection tool used by 
hackers 
Nikito Nikito v.2.1.4 
IDS enabled system Memory: 512 MB 
Operating system: Linux 
PCI network card: 10/100 Mbps 
CPU: P-III with 600 MHz 
Attacker system Memory: 1.5 GB 
Operating system: Linux 
PCI network card: 10/100/1000 Mbps 
CPU: AMD Geode LX running 
2.4/5GHz 
In addition, most of operating systems do not provide the tracing facilities but 
regardless of problems, we would like to obtain result in standardized method by 
using different programs on different operating systems. MSAIDS has fully support 
of algorithms and data structure that discover potential attacks and perturb the 
intrusions before the attacks. The performance highly depends on robust tracing 
facility and algorithms, which help to identify the intrusion. The first step is to 
analyze performance of proposed algorithms. However, overall target is to obtain 
accurate statistical data in highly loaded network. Test bed simulation provides 
promising result. The mean value is calculated with help of following theorem. 
Theorem 1: 
Assume x = test bed simulation;  
y= discrete simulation in C++ & ns2 simulation. 
R is the proposed approach MASIDS. 
Thus, Let f: [x, y] → R is the continuous function for closed interval [x, y] 
Therefore  
Let f: [x, y] → R is the differentiable continuous function for open interval (x, y) 
Here x < y. 
Hence z exists in (x, y) 
Such that 
f’ (x) = f (x) – f (y)/( x- y) 
 
6. Analysis of Result and Discussion 
The training period of experiment covers four classes of attacks probe, DOS, U2R and 
R2L. All detected attacks are included in database during the training period in test 
bed simulation. Ns2 and discrete simulation in C++ provides tracing facility to collect 
accurate data. The MSAIDS scans all rules of snort and includes new rules explained 
in proposed section 3. The testing period targets one concise scenario. The scenario is 
simulated by using same parameters for all three existing approaches including our 
proposed MSAIDS. The attacks are generated by using stick, covering all types of 
signatures and anomaly based attacks.  
The training period provides quite interesting results because frequently generated 
attacks are of different numbers. The maximum number of attacks pertains to R2L 
category. The more attacks are also counted on MSAIDS as compare with other three 
existing techniques are shown in table no.2. If attack is not generated then it is 
counted as normal traffic. The frequency of single and group characters is displayed 
when packets reach at the attacker machine. It is observed on the basis of output that 
different types of detected attacks are generated due to rogue DHCP server. 
The DOS attacks are detected when packet does not reach at destination and received 
no acknowledgment. The sign of probe attack is addition of new data in existing 
amount of data bytes. U2R is the sign of maximum connection duration. R2L attacks 
are little bit complex to detect. We apply method comprises of service requested and 
duration of connection for network and attempts failed login for host. It shows that 
proposed approach does not restrict the generating ratio of packets. From other side, 
the proposed approaches provides highest capturing ratio. The statistical results show 
that MSAIDS will substantiate to medical field for diagnosing several disease and 
especially for heart. The major breakthrough of this research is to detect the true 
positive and false negative attacks because they are very hard to capture.  
TABLE 2: Comparison of attacks on MSAIDS with other known techniques 
 
Due to these anomalies, confidentiality of any system is exploited and privacy of the 
user is exposed. The proposed method also captures the real worm attacks and all 
other looming attacks. The table 3 shows quantitative results for each scheme. 
The major advantage of MSAIDS approach is to detect all types of anomalies and 
unknown threats efficiently. The systems are mostly infected due to new sort of 
malwares because they consume the processing resources of system. If resources of 
system are utilized by unnecessary programs then MCL is highly affected. In 
consequence, collaboration process is disrupted. 
MSAIDS also detects the activity for any specific session. It creates specific alarm for 
each type of anomalies. Furthermore, deployed algorithms and new addition of rules 
in ordinary IDS improves the performance and restore the privacy of users.  
TABLE 3: Showing quantitative data for proposed and existing schemes 
Type of generated attack (MSAIDS) (DMSIDS) (ACOIDS) Signature based IDS 
DOS attacks 34214 33542 33421 32741 
U2R attacks 12454 11874 11845 11341 
R2L attacks 34123 32123 31092 29984 
Probe attacks 6214 8758 10181 4907 
Parameters (MSAIDS) (DMSIDS)   (ACOIDS) Signature based IDS 
total no: of packet  to be received 236719 198678 201938 178109 
total no: of packet  to be analyzed 236456 192453 197842 170098 
total no: of attack  to be generated 87005 86293 86539 78973 
total no: of signature based attack to 
be generated 
42003 42287 42585 35098 
total  no: of anomaly based attack to 
be generated 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d. True negative 
a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4860 
 
a. 8574 
b. 11987 
c. 16943 
d. 6502 
 
a. 8878 
b. 12007 
c. 16943 
d. 6126 
 
a. 8458 
b. 11289 
c. 12455 
d. 11673 
 
total number of anomaly based attack 
to be generated 
45002 44006 43954 43875 
total no: of attacks to be captured 87002 84212 83434 36098 
anomaly based attacked captured 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d. True negative 
a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4859 
 
a. 8324 
b. 11456 
c. 15678 
d. 6324 
 
a. 8678 
b. 11987 
c. 16789 
d. 6045 
 
a. 654 
b. 245 
c. 453 
d. 535 
 
total number of anomaly based attacks 
to be captured 
45001 41782 43499 1887 
signature based attacks to be captured 42001 42102 41091 34211 
The proposed method also captures the real worm attacks and all other looming 
attacks. MSAIDS captures known attacks frequently. The figure 6 shows capturing 
capability of known attacks. 
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Figure 6: showing generating known attacks and capturing capability of MSAIDS 
The major advantage of MSAIDS approach is also to detect all types of anomalies 
and unknown threats efficiently. The systems are mostly infected due to new sort of 
malwares because they consume the processing resources of system. If resources of 
system are utilized by unnecessary programs then communication is highly affected. 
In consequence, collaboration process is disrupted. MSAIDS also detects the activity 
for any specific session. It creates specific alarm for each type of anomalies. The 
beauty of this approach is high capturing capability of anomalies shown in figure 7.  
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Figure 7: generation of Anomalies vs. capturing capability of MSAIDS 
Furthermore, implemented algorithms and addition of some new rules in ordinary IDS 
improves the performance and restore the privacy of users. The implementation of 
MSAIDS is supported with sound architectural design that is robust and persistent 
when attack is detected. Statistical data shows 99.996% overall efficiency of 
MSAIDS shown in figure 8.  
The efficiency of MSAIDS is calculated with following formula: 
Here, overall efficiency = Ea;  
Total generated signature based attacks = TSA; 
Total anomaly based attacks =TAS;   
Missed signature based attacks = MSA; 
Missed anomaly based attacks = MAA & total generated attacks = TGA. 
Thus, Ea =   (TSA + TAA) – MSA + MAA) * 100 / TGA 
The proposed MSAIDS framework produces 2.269 to 49.11 higher capturing-rates 
than other existing techniques. The more interesting work of this research is detailed 
expression of all types of anomalies separately in form of false positive, false 
negative, true positive and true negative. 
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Figure 8. Comparison efficiency of all approaches 
 
These parameters give the concrete idea to use the features for various types of 
applications in real environment. The figure 9 shows the capturing capacity of 
MSAIDS and other existing techniques with respect the time during the testing 
period. 
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Figure 9: Overall efficiency of MSAIDS VS other existing techniques 
7.  Conclusion and Future Works 
In this paper, multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion detection 
systems (MSAIDS) is introduced. MSAIDS manages malicious activities of DHCP 
rogue server to restore privacy of users. The paper highlights malicious threats to be 
generated by DHCP rogue. The intruders use DHCP server to sniff traffic and finally 
deteriorate confidential information. The mechanism of current IDS does not have 
enough capability to control several types of malicious threats. Furthermore, several 
daunting and thrilling challenges in the arena of computer network security are 
impediment for secure communication. DHCP rogue is visibly very simple but 
crashes network as well as privacy of the users and even creates nastier attacks like 
Sniffing network traffic, masquerading attack, shutting down systems and DOS. The 
first is detailed explanation of attacks and how to resolve this issue. Second, we 
propose technique that is based on algorithms and addition of new rules in existing 
current IDS. These all of the components of proposal collectively handle the issues of 
DHCP rogue.  
To validate the proposal, the technique is simulated by using test bed. Two different 
kinds of systems are used in test bed; as one is reserved for intruder and other one is 
for legitimate user.  On basis of simulation, we obtain very interesting data, which 
show that MSAIDS improves capturing performance and controls attacks to be 
generated by DHCP rogue as compare with original IDS and other well known 
techniques. The findings demonstrate that MSAIDS has significantly reduced false 
alarms. Finally, we analyze overall efficiency of MSAIDS and existing techniques. In 
future, this technique will be deployed to measure the myocardits of heart.  
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